![]() ![]() That means any of the relays owned by the US government could be used to easily de-anonymize people. When the user landed at that final point and initiated a Hidden Service directory check, this information would be sent back down the chain as encoded data and the attacker knew where the user was going and what IP address they had used at that first relay.Īs if that wasn’t worrying enough for Tor users, the Project post noted “this signal would be easy to read and interpret by anybody who runs a relay and receives the encoded traffic”. In this particular attack, they used one of the relays to inject a “signal” into Tor protocol headers, which would be read at the end of the circuit. By correlating the data at these relays, an attacker could determine the IP address of a user and the site they were visiting. One was a "traffic confirmation" attack, in which the snoop monitors the two ends of a Tor circuit - the first and final hops on the journey to a deepweb site. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)Īs for what the hackers did with the relays, the Tor Project said it believed they used two methods in their attempts to unmask people. ![]()
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